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Abstract 
 
In March of 1976, President Gerald Ford agreed to host a 
reception for foreign ambassadors and their wives at the White House in 
celebration of the United States’ bicentennial. Brent Scowcroft, National 
Security Advisor, had recommended the reception as an alternative to a 
more elaborate event for foreign heads of state. In a February memo for 
the President, Scowcroft cautioned against “assembling leaders of widely 
differing political colorations,” anticipating that popular protests and 
demonstrations against these foreign leaders might overwhelm security 
officials.1 Scowcroft identified President Pinochet of Chile as one foreign 
head of state whose policies were so offensive to democratic ideals that 
his participation in the nation’s celebration of its bicentennial would call 
into question the spirit of the entire event.2 By this time, a domestic 
solidarity movement sympathetic to the victims of political repression 
under the Pinochet regime had not only gained visibility, but also 
attracted attention at the highest levels of the US government.  
In a 1973 coup d’état, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew 
President Salvador Allende’s democratically elected government. 
                                                      
1 Brent Scowcroft to President Gerald Ford, memorandum, “Bicentennial Event 
for Foreign Leaders, Foreign Policy Factors,” 12 February 1976, The Gerald R. 
Ford Presidential Digital Library; Jeanne W. Davis, memorandum, “Bicentennial 
Event for Foreign Leaders,” 8 March 1976, The Gerald R. Ford Presidential 
Digital Library.  
2 Ibid. 
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Consolidating his regime, Pinochet saw the supporters of Allende—a 
Marxist—as enemies of the state and arrested them, along with 
thousands of Latin Americans who had sought refuge in Chile during 
Allende’s presidency. Many were then tortured or executed, causing 
hundreds of thousands to flee Chile for other nations in the Americas 
and Europe.3 Acting on the orders of President Richard M. Nixon, who 
believed that Allende and the Popular Unity coalition posed a communist 
threat to US economic interests across the Western Hemisphere, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided material support to the 
Pinochet coup. Having participated in the overthrow of Allende and the 
installation of the Pinochet regime, the United States was reluctant to 
admit Allende’s leftist supporters as refugees.  
Despite the government’s relations with the Pinochet regime, a 
popular solidarity movement in the United States achieved important 
successes for the Chilean refugees. The groups that contributed most to 
the effort to settle them in the US were activists on university campuses, 
religious groups, non-governmental organizations, and several key figures 
in Congress. These actors not only educated the American public about 
their country’s role in Latin America, but also turned human rights into a 
discussion topic within the government and among the public.  
Further, this domestic solidarity movement was the driving force 
behind cuts in aid to Pinochet’s Chile in 1974, as well as the Special 
Parole Program for Chilean Refugees in 1975. Enacted two full years 
after the Pinochet coup, this 1975 parole program brought four hundred 
families into the United States, who most notably settled in California, 
New York, and Florida.4 Settlement in the United States, however, was 
unavailable to members of the Communist party, leftist revolutionaries, 
and those who had never been detained but anticipated future 
persecution from the Pinochet regime. The United States’ fear of 
sheltering communists and reluctance to “encumber its relations with the 
Santiago government” delayed establishment of the program.5 The 
eventual enactment of a parole program in the United States, however, is 
a testament to the strength of the Chilean solidarity movement and the 
complementary efforts of concerned citizens and politicians.  
                                                      
3 Diana Childress, Augusto Pinochet’s Chile (Minneapolis: Lerner, 2009), 91. 
4 Margaret Power, “The US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” 
Latin American Perspectives 36 (2009): 50; “Chilean Americans,” Countries and 
Their Cultures, accessed December 7, 2014, 
http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Bu-Dr/Chilean-Americans.html.  
5 David Binder, “US to Admit Hundreds of Chilean Exiles,” New York Times, 
June 14, 1975. 
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Sympathy for the victims of Pinochet’s regime in Chile arose in 
reaction to the “realpolitik” policies of Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger. Kissinger believed that in the United States’ best interest was 
the preeminence of US political and economic interests abroad, without a 
moral consideration of the policies’ consequences on the countries they 
affected. Such logic justified turning a blind eye to the human rights 
abuses of Pinochet’s anticommunist regime. With the Watergate scandal 
unfolding and a disheartening loss in Vietnam increasingly apparent, 
allegations of covert US involvement in the Chilean coup would have 
been discouraging to citizens, but hardly surprising. Americans perceived 
US interference in Chile in the context of Watergate and the Vietnam 
War, which led many to identify dishonesty and aggression as recurrent 
themes in their nation’s leadership. These Americans concluded that US 
interests would not be best served by forced economic and political 
dominance abroad, but by the restoration of a healthy democracy at 
home. Their cause found strength in its broad appeal, and thus was 
successful in bringing the plight of Chile’s refugees to the attention of a 
disinclined government.   
 
The United States, Latin America, and the Pinochet Coup d’État of 
1973 
 
“Make the economy scream,” recorded Director of Central 
Intelligence Richard Helms in his notebook during a September 1970 
meeting with President Nixon.6 Referring to the Chilean economy, 
Helms and Nixon anticipated the elections the country was set to have in 
November and feared that the Marxist candidate, Salvador Allende, 
would win the presidency.7 The United States sought to inhibit Chile’s 
transition to socialism by crippling the country’s economy, an initiative 
that intensified when Allende won the close election on November 4, 
1970 by a plurality of only thirty-six percent of the popular vote. 
Two days later, the National Security Council met in Washington 
and developed what President Nixon dubbed a “correct but cool” policy 
towards Allende’s Chile.8  The United States would “maximize pressures 
on the Allende government” in order to “prevent its consolidation and 
limit its ability to implement policies contrary to US and hemisphere 
                                                      
6 Richard Helms, handwritten notes, “Meeting with the President,” 15 
September 1970, The National Security Archive.  
7 The CIA also interfered in the 1964 Chilean elections, providing aid to 
Eduardo Frei Montalva, who defeated Allende.  
8 Henry A. Kissinger, memorandum, “National Security Decision Memorandum 
93: Policy Towards Chile,” 9 November 1970, The National Security Archive. 
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interests.”9 These “pressures” were largely economic. The decision 
prohibited any new bilateral and multilateral aid to Chile, with the 
exception of aid to the rightwing military. When possible, preexisting 
commitments would be “reduced, delayed or terminated.”10 This attack 
on Chile’s economy politicized even “programs of a humanitarian 
character,” which would thereafter be considered only “on a case by case 
basis.”11 
At first, Allende’s policies were successful in expanding 
employment and consumption in Chile’s recessing economy, progress 
that benefited the poor. His moderate policies also calmed the Chilean 
middle class, who had feared that the Allende administration would 
become a communist dictatorship. In April of 1971, these successes 
helped the Left win a majority in municipal elections, which Allende 
interpreted as a signal to accelerate his socialist initiatives.12 In addition to 
nationalizing the banking sector and implementing land reforms, he 
nationalized Chile’s US-owned copper mines with the unanimous 
support of Chile’s congress.13 The nationalization of the mines, signed 
into law in July of 1971, occurred without compensation of the mines’ 
American owners.14 Concern that Allende’s initiatives might facilitate the 
spread of socialism and anti-American policies across the hemisphere 
motivated Washington’s economic pressure on the Allende government.    
Allende’s path to socialism was expensive, and the Soviet Union 
was unwilling to finance a revolution it concluded Chile was not ready 
for.15 Prior to Allende’s presidency, Chile had been the largest recipient 
of aid from the Kennedy Administration’s Alliance for Progress, an aid 
program for Latin American countries launched in 1962 in reaction to the 
Cuban Revolution. Between 1964 and 1969, the initiative brought over $1 
billion in direct and overt aid from the United States to Chile.16 The US 
                                                      
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Kissinger, “Policy Towards Chile,” 1970.  
12 Elizabeth Quay Hutchison, Thomas Miller Klubock, and Nara B. Milanich, 
The Chile Reader (Durham: Duke University, 2014), 400. 
13 Ibid; Tom Hadden, “Chile,” Fortnight 69 (1973): 9; John Fleming, “The 
Nationalization of Chile’s Large Copper Companies in Contemporary Interstate 
Relations,” Villanova Law Review 18(1973): 1-2.  
14 Hadden, “Chile,” 9. 
15 Ibid; Joseph L. Nogee and John W. Sloan, “Allende’s Chile and the Soviet 
Union: A policy lesson for Latin American Nations Seeking Autonomy,” Journal 
of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 21:3 (1979): 359 
16 United States Senate, Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, by Senate Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
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reduced this figure to $10.1 million by 1973, contributing to the collapse 
of Chile’s economy and an inflation rate of 300%.17 By cutting off aid to 
Chile, the US indeed made Chile’s economy “scream.”  
The repercussions of these economic pressures offset the gains 
the country expected to achieve through nationalizing the mining 
industry. Allende characterized US pressure as “an oblique, underhanded, 
indirect form of aggression,” though his own policies contributed to the 
country’s economic crisis as well.18 Allende’s policies created a demand 
that Chilean production could not meet, forcing the government to divert 
its resources from new investment towards supporting that demand 
instead. In an effort to save the failing economy, the Chilean government 
increased the amount of currency in circulation, which aggravated 
inflation.19  
In December of 1971, a march remembered as the “March of 
the Empty Pots” protested the shortages of food and basic goods caused 
by Allende and the Popular Unity’s economic policies. Beating on pots 
and pans, women of the middle and upper classes accused the party of 
favoring the politically connected with access to goods at lower prices.20 
This women’s movement became the Poder Femenino (Feminine 
Power), whose vice-president reiterated her support of the 1973 Pinochet 
coup during a 1990 interview. “I have always supported democracy and I 
always supported the September 11th military coup,” she explained, 
“because Chile had no other alternative.”21 Her statement demonstrates 
the Chilean opposition’s conviction that preserving the country’s 
democracy required a military coup to overthrow the President’s 
government. 
Though electoral support for Allende increased from thirty-six 
percent of the population to forty-four percent between 1970 and 1973, 
the turbulent transition to socialism gave rise to a virulent opposition, 
which included the military.22 The collapse of the economy cost Allende 
the support of the middle class as well. As the Chilean economy and 
Allende’s legitimacy suffered, the CIA supported the president’s 
                                                                                                                     
Activities (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1975), 
4.  
17 Mark Falcoff, "Chile, Pinochet, the Opposition, and the United States," World 
Affairs Institute 149.4 (1987): 184-185. 
18 Paul E. Sigmund, “The Politicization of the Militiary,” in The Overthrow of 
Allende and the Politics of Chile (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 
193.  
19 Julio Faundez, “The defeat of politics: Chile under Allende,” Boletín de Estudios 
Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 28 (1980): 73-74. 
20 Hutchison, The Chile Reader, 406. 
21 Carmen Saenz as quoted in Hutchison, The Chile Reader, 409. 
22 Hadden, “Chile,” 9.  
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opponents. Between 1970 and 1973, the military received $8 million from 
the CIA.23 Aid was also directed towards maintaining the opposition’s 
ideological presence in Chile through the financial support of political 
newspapers, for example.24 US interference paired with domestic 
reactions to Allende’s failed economic policies permitted General 
Pinochet and the Chilean military, again with the support of the CIA, to 
overthrow the president on September 11, 1973. Over the course of the 
next two years, direct aid to Pinochet’s Chile from the United States 
would increase by $167 million.25  
Though violent, the coup itself was quick. A full year later, 
however, Pinochet still considered the country to be in a “state of war 
and a state of siege.”26 The military junta directed this “siege” at those 
affiliated with any political organization it considered a possible threat to 
the consolidation of the regime. Pinochet’s targets included both 
Allende’s Chilean supporters and the thousands of left-leaning Latin 
Americans who had been persecuted in their native countries and 
welcomed into Chile during Allende’s presidency. In a 1974 report on the 
situation in Chile, Amnesty International confirmed Le Monde’s 
September 1973 assessment that 4,000 Bolivians, 3,000 Uruguayans, 
2,000 Argentineans, and 1,200 Brazilians had settled in Chile “to enjoy 
the political freedom” of the Allende government. The majority of these 
individuals risked “imprisonment, torture or even death if they returned 
to their countries of origin.”27 
The international community immediately recognized that the 
coup posed a threat to the leftist Latin American refugees in Chile. The 
junta insisted on the refugees’ intent to instigate a civil war in Chile, and 
circulated pamphlets encouraging citizens to denounce all suspect foreign 
nationals because they had “come to kill Chileans.”28 Many of the 
refugees were subsequently detained by the regime and tortured. Some 
were executed by military officials, while others were shot by local law 
                                                      
23 Falcoff, “Chile, Pinochet, the Opposition, and the United States,” 185. 
24 Julio de Mesquita Neto to President Gerald Ford, telegram, “Chilean 
newspapers that have received financial assistance,” 30 October 1974, The 
National Security Archive.  
25 Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, “Congress and the Choice of Victims,” in 
Calculated Kindness (New York: Free, 1998), 97. 
26 Amnesty International, “Chile: an Amnesty International report,” report, 
(London: Amnesty International Publications, 1974): 5. 
27 Amnesty International, “Chile: an Amnesty International report,” 64; Loescher 
and Scanlan, “Congress and the Choice of Victims,” 95. 
28 Amnesty International, “Chile: an Amnesty International report,” 64. 
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enforcement after revealing their foreign identity.29 In 1974, the junta 
decided to release and expel nearly all of the roughly 450 foreign 
detainees it held captive alongside Chileans at the National Stadium in a 
Santiago suburb. Most of them fled the country on their own, found 
protection in foreign embassies, or were resettled by the United Nations 
Refugee Agency.30 
Though forced disappearances of Chilean citizens occurred 
throughout Pinochet’s seventeen-year dictatorship, most were committed 
between 1974 and 1977.31 Amnesty International estimates that under 
Pinochet, 40,000 Chileans were detained, denounced, or arrested because 
of their association with the former Allende government.32 In 1974, the 
Chicago Commission of Inquiry in Santiago recorded the testimonies of 
several Chilean detainees, who remembered being brutally beaten and 
humiliated until they signed a document admitting to criminal acts against 
the Pinochet regime. Many were physically scarred from the torture, 
which the commission concluded was used systematically during 
interrogations. Over the course of the regime, three thousand individuals 
were either executed or disappeared.33  
The United States, prioritizing its economic and diplomatic 
relationship with Chile, was reluctant to condemn the abuses of the 
Pinochet dictatorship. Consequently, its response to these abuses differed 
greatly from that of its European and Latin American allies. When 
Allende was overthrown, many of his supporters sought protection in the 
embassies of other Latin American nations. As signatories to the Treaty 
of Caracas, these countries were committed to grant the refugees 
diplomatic asylum. Refugees overwhelmed the Argentinean, Venezuelan, 
Panamanian, Mexican, and Ecuadorian embassies, and the junta stationed 
officials outside who were poised to fire on anyone seeking refuge. To 
relieve the crowded embassies, European ambassadors agreed to shelter 
Chileans as well. The United States did not.34  
Though US Ambassador to Chile David Popper raised human 
rights concerns with Washington, the US continued to increase aid to 
Chile. In 1975, the United States offered $66.8 million in total to Latin 
American countries through the American Food for Peace program. Of 
this amount, $57.8 million went directly to Pinochet’s Chile, though many 
                                                      
29 Ibid, 64-65. 
30 Ibid.  
31 “Truth Commission: Chile 90,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed 
December 9, 2014, http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-chile-
90. 
32 Amnesty International, “Chile: an Amnesty International report,” 6. 
33 Ibid, 57-58. 
34 Ibid, 67; Loescher and Scanlan, “Congress and the Choice of Victims,” 95-96. 
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Latin American countries were considerably poorer.35 To avoid damaging 
its relationship with the Pinochet regime, the United States refused to 
support the resettlement initiatives of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and the Intergovernmental Commission for European 
Migration until 1976, when the majority of the Chilean refugees had 
already been resettled in Europe, Canada, and other Latin American 
countries.36  
As National Security Advisor under President Nixon, Henry 
Kissinger was the primary motivator behind CIA involvement in the 
1973 coup. He instructed Ambassador Popper to “cut the political 
science lectures,” and ignored advisors who argued that US interference 
in Chile was inappropriate because Allende was neither a moral nor 
security threat to the United States.37 Under President Ford, Kissinger 
served as Secretary of State and continued to advance a policy of support 
for Pinochet, still claiming that the anticommunist dictatorship best 
served US national interest.38 A pro-American government in Chile, he 
insisted, would preserve foreign investment opportunities and US access 
to raw materials, as well as prevent other Latin American governments 
from adopting socialist policies. Americans in solidarity with the Chilean 
refugees, therefore, would be tasked with convincing the US government 
and people that supporting a military dictator would in fact be of no 
long-term benefit to the United States.  
 
US Solidarity with Chilean Refugees 
 
Five days after Allende’s ousting, President Nixon and then 
National Security Advisor Kissinger connected by telephone. After 
considering how the coup would be portrayed in the newspapers, Nixon 
expressed to Kissinger, “well we didn’t—as you know—our hand doesn’t 
show on this one though.” Kissinger agreed, confirming, “we only helped 
them.” In closing, the men concurred that because Allende’s presidency 
was “an anti-American government all the way,” the people “aren’t going 
to buy this crap from the Liberals on this one.”39 Reflecting on the events 
                                                      
35 Loescher and Scanlan, “Congress and the Choice of Victims,” 97. 
36 Ibid, 98. 
37 Ibid, 97; Viron P. Vaky to Henry Kissinger, memorandum, “Chile – 40 
Committee Meeting,” 14 September 1970, the National Security Archive. 
38 Peter Kornbluh, “Secret Documents Show Nixon, Kissinger Role Backing 
1973 Coup,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2Ki6nWSeVQ (10 
September 2013). 
39 Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, phone call transcript, 16 September 1973, 
11:50AM, the National Security Archive. 
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of September 11, 1973, the two men assured each other that the extent of 
American involvement would not be revealed, and that a popular 
movement in response to the coup was unlikely to coalesce in the United 
States.   
The very next day, a rally in front of Willard Straight Hall at 
Cornell University protested not only the ousting of Allende’s 
government, but also the United States’ role in the coup. An article 
printed in the Cornell Daily Sun on September 18 reports that at the rally, 
Professor James Petras of the State University of New York at 
Binghamton “accused the news media of trying to cover up United States 
involvement in internal Chilean affairs.”40 Less than one week after the 
Marxist government was overthrown, two Cornell students encouraged 
their peers to sign petitions that urged both the Senate Committee on 
Refugees and the United Nations Committee on Refugees to support the 
resettlement of the thousands of Chileans Pinochet was targeting.41  
One month after the coup, San Jose State University Professor 
Patricia Fagen argued to an audience at Stanford University that “the US 
government’s ‘low-profile’ economic policies played just as important a 
role as CIA action in bringing down the Chilean government, which was 
a model for democracy.”42 These early reactions demonstrate that 
contrary to Nixon and Kissinger’s expectations, the American public 
suspected US involvement in the coup from the beginning, and quickly 
identified the Nixon Administration’s military and economic interference 
in Chilean affairs.  
American universities and academics were crucial to the Chilean 
solidarity movement. While rallies and talks were held at colleges across 
the United States following the 1973 coup in Chile, campus opposition to 
US policies in Latin America was part of a broader academic movement 
in exploration of the region’s culture and history. As news of the human 
rights abuses of Pinochet’s dictatorship reached the United States, 
academics researched the most efficient methods of human rights “fact-
finding,” and the number of courses on human rights at colleges and law 
schools across the country rose dramatically.43 In 1975, for example, the 
Committee on US-Latin American Relations (CUSLAR) at Cornell 
worked with professors to design a new class that allowed students to 
                                                      
40 Debra Goodman, “Student Rally Defends Allende,” The Cornell Daily Sun [Ithaca, 
New York], September 18, 1973. 
41 Ibid.  
42 David Smith, “Professors’ Charges: CIA ‘Not Alone’ in Chile Coup,” The 
Stanford Daily [Stanford, California], October 11, 1974. 
43 Kenneth Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United 
States,” The Journal of American History 86:3 (1999): 1234 and 1236; Cindy 
Crowner, “CUSLAR in the 1970s from Chile to Nicaragua,” CUSLAR Newsletter, 
July/August, 1990, 12.  
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direct their own research projects within the human rights field. Cindy 
Crowner, who would later become CUSLAR’s coordinator, said that this 
course and a later one called “The International Economic Disorder 
Seminar” made her a “true believer” in CUSLAR’s commitment to 
redirect US policy towards Latin America.44  
In 1974, the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) created 
the Emergency Committee to Aid Latin American Scholars (ECALAS), 
supported in part by a $25,000 grant from the Ford Foundation. 
ECALAS brought one hundred Chilean professors who had been 
persecuted by Pinochet to the United States as “visiting faculty.”45 Mario 
Valenzuela, one of Allende’s top ministers, was the fifteenth intellectual 
brought to an American university through ECALAS. He taught a course 
called “The Organization of American States” at Bowdoin College, after 
over half of the institution’s students and forty-five members of its 
faculty signed a petition urging the college’s administration to offer 
Valenzuela the temporary position.46  
Cornell University’s CUSLAR was another effective sponsor of 
Chilean refugees. In 1974, CUSLAR founder Bill Rogers agreed to 
sponsor Joel Gajardo, a Chilean Presbyterian minister, who at that time 
was still detained at the National Stadium in Santiago. In 1990, Rogers 
remembered that bringing Gajardo into the United States required that 
he and CUSLAR invent a job for the Chilean in order to fulfill State 
Department requirements. Consequently, Rogers appointed Gajardo as 
the committee’s director, without ever having met him.47  
CUSLAR had a close relationship with Friends of Chile, an 
ecumenical association that settled and supported several Chilean families 
in Ithaca and other towns in Upstate New York with the help of Cornell 
University and local churches.48 The organization took advantage of the 
refugees’ presence in Ithaca by bringing them to local elementary schools, 
                                                      
44 Crowner, “CUSLAR in the 1970s,” 12.  
45 American Association for the Advancement of Science, “AAAS: Assisting 
Chilean Scholars,” resolution, 1 March 1974; Jack Aley, “Former Chilean Official 
Will Teach at Bowdoin,” The Nashua Telegraph [Nashua, New Hampshire], 
January 23, 1974; Benedetta Calandra, “‘The Good Americans’: US Solidarity 
Networks for Chilean and Argentinean Refugees (1973-1983),” Historia Actual 
Online 23 (October, 2010): 24. 
46 The Nashua Telegraph, “Former Chilean Official Will Teach at Bowdoin,” 
1974. 
47 Cindy Crowner, “CUSLAR in the 1970s,” 12. 
48 “Announcing a New Book from the CUSLAR Press,” Committee on US-
Latin American Relations, accessed December 7, 2014, 
http://cuslar.org/2014/05/06/historyisours/. 
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where the Chileans discussed the implications of the Pinochet 
dictatorship with children. The refugees’ classroom visits were paired 
with CUSLAR presentations on Latin American history and the United 
States’ role in shaping it, an initiative that was so inspiring to the children 
that they wrote to the President, asking that military aid to the Chilean 
dictatorship be halted for good.49 
Universities were important to the solidarity movement because 
they provided real opportunities for individuals to demonstrate their 
support of Chilean refugees, regardless of the federal government’s 
policy. Cornell rallies against US interference in Latin America over the 
course of the 1970s, for instance, were so effective that the CIA greatly 
reduced its recruitment presence at the university.50 Former Cornell 
student Bill Gasparini, a freshman in 1978, believed that the projects of 
organizations like CUSLAR and the demonstrations on his campus kept 
the reality of the refugees’ plight on his mind, and helped him translate 
lessons from campus lectures into action.51  
Domestic support of the Chilean refugees, however, was hardly 
limited to university campuses. Religious groups and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) concerned with the protection of human rights 
were also important actors in pushing the solidarity movement with Chile 
forward. A significant development of the mid-1970s was their shift from 
grassroots organizing to lobbying at the highest levels of the government. 
Kenneth Cmiel, director of the University of Iowa’s Center for Human 
Rights, attributes this shift to the information age and the global 
circulation of images and literature it fostered.52  
Amnesty International’s development into one of the world’s 
foremost investigators of human rights abuses was part of a broader call 
for political transparency. Founded in 1961, the organization expressed in 
its bylaws, for example, that “information is the core of the work of the 
movement.”53 Amnesty’s movement grew quickly; between 1970 and 
1976, membership in Amnesty International USA jumped from 6,000 to 
35,000 individuals. The organization, at the first ever congressional 
hearing on human rights in 1973, encouraged Congress to participate in 
“the maximum exchange of information.”54 
                                                      
49 Cindy Crowner, “CUSLAR in the 1970s,” 15. 
50 “CUSLAR: Living History,” Committee on US-Latin American Relations, 
accessed December 9, 2014, http://cuslar.org/2014/10/15/cuslar-living-
history/. 
51 Cindy Crowner, “CUSLAR in the 1970s,” 15. 
52 Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States,” 1233. 
53 Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States,” 1235-
6. 
54 Ibid.  
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Amnesty International started publishing and circulating reports 
on its investigative missions in 1973, thus supporting the rapidly growing 
community of US human rights NGOs with credible facts as they 
lobbied for a tougher congressional stance on the violations of the 
Pinochet dictatorship.55 Many smaller NGOs sent their own fact-finding 
missions to Chile, as well. After 1975, the Chilean exile community in the 
United States also supported US NGOs’ lobbying efforts by providing 
them with lists of political prisoners and the disappeared, which the 
NGOs then took to their allies in Congress.56  
The founding of the Washington Office on Latin America 
(WOLA) reflected the US NGO community’s new focus on Congress. 
WOLA was born out of the Latin American Strategy Committee (LASC), 
an association of North American church groups with a focus on justice 
and peace in Latin America. After the Pinochet coup, the coalition came 
together and created WOLA with an intent to “move into high gear, with 
primary attention now on the Congress.”57 WOLA lobbied Congress and 
provided congressmen sympathetic to the Chilean refugees with the 
information they needed to further their cause.58  
WOLA was one of several religious-based institutions that made 
major contributions to the Chilean solidarity movement. In reaction to 
the horrors committed against both Allende’s supporters and the 
refugees he had welcomed into Chile, nearly fifteen religious 
organizations criticized US policy on the basis that it was “immoral and 
indefensible” through a petition addressed to President Gerald Ford in 
1974.59 In this petition, the signatories also claimed that American 
missionaries in Chile had observed and felt the real effects of the United 
States’ covert interventions, and therefore had a unique perspective on 
the gravity of the Pinochet regime’s abuses.  
Frederick McGuire of the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops (USCCB) traveled to Chile in 1974, and his report of the 
                                                      
55 In the early 1970s, there were several human rights NGOs lobbying Congress; 
by 1980 there were over fifty; Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights in the 
United States,” 1237; Amnesty International, “Chile: an Amnesty International 
report,” 1974. 
56 Benedetta Calandra, “Exile and Diaspora in an Atypical Context: Chileans and 
Argentineans in the United States (1973-2005)” Bulletin of Latin American Research 
32:3 (2013): 313. 
57 Thomas E. Quigley, “WOLA, from the start,” Cross Currents (November 2004): 
3-4. 
58 Power, “The US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” 53. 
59 An Open Letter to President Gerald Ford, October 7, 1974, in Calandra (2010), 25-
26.  
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experience reflects other religious organizations’ moral objection to US 
policy in Latin America. Like the petition’s signatories, he too expressed 
the belief that his first-hand knowledge of the conditions in Pinochet’s 
Chile made his account valuable to Congress.60 McGuire and the USCCB 
as a whole called on Congress to reduce US aid to the regime until it 
could demonstrate that it had put an end to systematic abuses of human 
rights.61   
The NGOs and religious groups who lobbied Congress for 
increased attention to the victims of Pinochet’s dictatorship found 
important allies in Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Robert 
Drinan. Shortly after the coup, Kennedy called on the US government to 
“provide asylum and resettlement opportunities under appropriate 
provisions of the immigration and nationality act to a reasonable number 
of political refugees.”62 Similarly, Drinan suggested to the House “that 
the United States give the same treatment to those suffering persecution 
in Chile as we have given to Hungarian freedom fighters and the refugees 
from Fidel Castro’s Cuba.”63  Both within one week of the 1973 coup, 
Kennedy and Drinan introduced bills to admit Chilean refugees into the 
United States. Congress’s resistance to welcoming Marxists into the 
country, however, prevented their success. In response to Drinan’s bill, 
Representative John Rarick wrote that “influential Americans are 
assisting these Chileans by urging the US Government to provide asylum 
for these so-called ‘political refugees,’ who are equated with genuine 
escapees from Hungary and Cuba.”64 For Rarick, a ‘refugee’ was 
someone who had resisted communism abroad, not a committed 
supporter of Allende’s Marxist government.65  
Nevertheless, Drinan and Kennedy kept the plight of Chilean 
refugees on Congress’s agenda. In 1974, Kennedy won Congress’s 
approval on an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The Kennedy 
Amendment, as it would be known, set a $25 million ceiling on assistance 
to Chile while prohibiting the use of those funds towards security 
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assistance or arms sales.66 Senator Kennedy in particular would be a 
positive force behind the eventual establishment of the 1975 parole 
program for Chileans. 
Though his initiatives were not in explicit support of resettling 
Chilean refugees in the United States, Representative Tom Harkin was an 
important supporter of Representative Drinan and Senator Kennedy in 
Congress. In September 1975, he secured passage of the Harkin 
Amendment to the Foreign Service Act, which established that countries 
whose governments engaged in “gross and persistent” human rights 
violations would not be eligible for economic and military assistance 
from the United States.67 The following year, he and an aide traveled to 
Chile on a fact-finding mission. Harkin and his aide broke into Villa 
Grimaldi, a secret police headquarters and torture center in Santiago that 
the dictatorship had insisted did not exist. Harkin’s confirmation of its 
existence forced the Pinochet regime to publically acknowledge the 
center just as Pinochet, concerned about cuts to US aid to his regime, had 
been trying to convince Congress that Chile was “making progress” in 
human rights.68 
These actors—American universities, non-governmental 
organizations, religious groups, and certain congressmen—
complemented each other to consolidate a broad, public condemnation 
of US policy into a single well-rounded solidarity movement, which 
ultimately brought Chilean refugees to the United States. Though each 
were important contributors to the movement, they depended on one 
another. The congressmen, for example, relied on NGOs to provide 
witnesses for their congressional hearings on human rights and foreign 
policy. The witnesses’ moving testimonies, in conjunction with other 
congressional initiatives, illuminated the regime’s routine violation of 
human rights. The accounts would help garner support for the 1975 
parole program, as well as establish the regime’s ineligibility for US aid.69 
NGOs, religious groups, and activists on university campuses depended 
on the congressmen in Washington to convert their demonstrations and 
research into legislation. Cindy Crowner of CUSLAR recalls sending 
Cornell University students to Washington to lobby the nation’s 
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congressmen, where they “marched through the halls of Congress urging 
all kinds of senators and congresspersons to oppose further aid [to 
Chile].”70 Civilian activists and congressmen thus worked together to 
change US policy towards Pinochet’s regime.   
 
The Successes of US Solidarity with Chileans 
 
The US solidarity movement had to address two principal 
obstacles in its effort to redirect US government policy. First, Pinochet’s 
targets were the supporters of Allende, a Marxist. Given the Cold War 
context, conservatives in Congress were reluctant to admit known leftists 
fleeing an anticommunist and pro-American government into the United 
States.71 Secondly, the movement had to challenge Kissinger’s 
presumption that keeping socialists out of power in Chile was in the 
United States’ national interest, as this idea was his justification for 
ignoring the tremendous human rights abuses that occurred in Pinochet’s 
Chile.72 The solidarity movement could not change the Chilean refugees’ 
political ideology, but the discussion that surrounds the movement 
indicates an effort to take on Kissinger’s definition of what would most 
benefit the United States.  
In supporting the Pinochet coup, the United States was behind 
the violence that tore down the oldest democracy in South America.73 As 
discussions regarding the facilitation of Allende’s ousting began in 1970, 
Viron Vaky of the National Security Council expressed to Kissinger that 
“what we propose is patently a violation of our own principles and policy 
tenets.”74 In her talk at Stanford, Professor Patricia Fagen referred to the 
power Kissinger and Nixon wielded in crafting US policy towards Chile, 
and said, “presumably only in totalitarian countries are such far-ranging 
decisions made in secret by one or two men.”75 At his inauguration in 
1977, President Jimmy Carter proposed that “the best way to enhance 
freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system 
is worthy of emulation.”76 The expressed concerns of Vaky, Fagen, and 
Carter over the course of the 1970s each connect the United States’ 
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involvement in Latin America to a concern for the health of the United 
States’ democracy. With the condition of US democracy highlighted by 
the celebration of its bicentennial, one could have argued that nothing 
was more in the best interest of the country than the restoration of the 
principles upon which it was founded.  
In a 1974 article that acknowledged the CIA had sent $8 million 
to Allende’s opposition between 1970 and 1973, Time Magazine painted 
Chile as “much more a totalitarian than a democratic state.”77 Most of the 
journals and magazines of the era that discussed the Chilean military 
dictatorship similarly linked the CIA to Chile’s crumbled democracy.78 
From magazine readers to government officials, Americans observed the 
United States’ support of a dictator’s destruction of a democracy and 
were disheartened. That an assertion as provocative as the purported 
failure of American democracy caught on, however, is indicative of the 
historical moment in which the 1973 coup occurred.  
As the Vietnam War wound down and the Watergate scandal 
unfolded, by 1973 the US government’s willingness to intervene in the 
affairs of sovereign nations and act in a secretive, unethical manner was 
well known. Americans, consequently, understood the covert interference 
in Chilean politics within these terms. Drawing this connection between 
the United States’ involvement in Vietnam and in Chile, Cornell student 
Jack Schrager wrote to the editor of the Cornell Daily Sun in 1973 claiming 
that activists in defense of the victimized Chileans did not demand 
changes of Pinochet, but the attention of the US government. Schrager 
argued that the “anti-war agitators of the sixties” demonstrated with the 
same desire to challenge their government’s interference in the affairs of 
a sovereign nation.   
While Congress authorized the Vietnam War with the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution in 1964, US covert involvement in Chile excluded 
Congress and involved CIA action purely on the orders of the President. 
Though the nature of US interference in Vietnam and Chile was 
different, at the heart of the popular response to both situations was the 
same rejection of the government’s imperialist tendencies abroad. In a 
publication entitled “Viet-Report,” for example, the North American 
Congress on Latin America (NACLA) argued that “Vietnam was not an 
isolated case.”79 Even before the Pinochet coup occurred, NACLA drew 
parallels between US imperialism in Vietnam and in Latin America, 
cautioning that intervention in the Western Hemisphere would be just as 
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devastating to the United States as the conflict in Vietnam had been. 
Both NACLA and Community Action on Latin America, a research 
center founded in 1971, released publications titled “The Vietnamization 
of Latin America,” and pointed to a pivot of US imperialist tendencies 
from Asia to Latin America. 80 
The dishonesty behind the Watergate scandal further 
discouraged Americans about the reality of their government’s decision-
making.81 The evidence confirming the President’s guilt in the 1972 
break-in of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters mounted 
just months before the public would learn of the CIA’s support of the 
1973 Chilean coup. Joseph Eldridge, the founder of WOLA and the aide 
who accompanied Representative Harkin on his 1976 fact-finding 
mission to Santiago, demonstrated the degree of public disillusionment 
with the US government after Watergate by pointing to the results of the 
1974 midterm elections. In a 2004 interview, Eldridge remembered that 
of the ninety-two members elected to Congress, three-fourths were 
Democrats. He referred to them as the “Watergate babies” and explains 
that “they were angling for change; they were willing to take on the 
government, they were reformers, they were the people who were 
instrumental in pushing this reform along.”82  
The religious organizations that signed the aforementioned 
petition to President Gerald Ford in 1974, the same year as WOLA’s 
founding, articulated the particular reform sought in the aftermath of 
Watergate. The scandal, they wrote, proved that the United States’ 
“gangster methods” used across the Third World “[would] eventually be 
turned against our own citizens.”83 Watergate highlighted the distance 
between the people of the United States and their government, and 
proved that the dishonest government itself was the biggest threat to the 
democracy it was supposed to protect.  
The US government classified national interest as the opposition 
of leftist gains in the Western Hemisphere and the dominance of the US 
economy abroad, but the American people were alienated from their 
country’s leadership following the Vietnam War and the Watergate 
Scandal. As citizens of a country whose government exercised “gangster 
methods,” their perception of the United States’ foremost national 
priority looked inwards, and called for the restoration of democratic and 
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principled leadership. It was this historical and social context created by 
the aftermath of the Vietnam War and Watergate that allowed a 
movement in support of Chilean refugees to take hold in the United 
States, even though the US government had supported the right-wing 
dictator that caused the outflow of refugees in the first place.  
The principal success of this solidarity movement was the 
establishment of the Special Parole Program for Chilean Refugees in June 
1975, made possible in large part by Senator Kennedy. In September 
1974, the Chilean government announced that it would release the 
majority of its detainees if foreign governments would accept them.84 
Following the Chilean government’s announcement, the Office of 
Refugee and Migration Affairs called on the State Department to develop 
a parole program for the Chileans, a proposal that took over seven 
months to reach the Attorney General because of resistance from the 
Nixon and Ford administrations as well as from much of Congress. The 
State Department and the proposal’s supporters in Congress, addressing 
the suspect political affiliations of the refugees, insisted that this program 
would not involve the “blanket admission” of Chileans, that very few 
would be admitted, and that none would be communists.85 The Special 
Parole Program for Chilean Refugees, nevertheless, did bring 
approximately one thousand individuals to the United States who 
brought fresh energy to the solidarity movement.86  
At this time, many Americans found ways to further commit 
themselves to solidarity with the Chilean refugees. The parole program, 
for example, required that Chileans obtain private sponsors before 
entering the United States, though the government did not provide the 
refugees with the resources to identify them. Churches across the country 
responded to this need, and helped connect Chilean refugees with 
American families that would sponsor them. Seventy-five of the four 
hundred families that came to the United States through the 1975 parole 
program took advantage of the sponsoring services offered by the 
Lutheran Council.87 In 1976, one Lutheran refugee sponsor wrote, “The 
Chilean experience is sensitizing us to repression and human need in a 
much more personal way than could ever be known by writing out a 
check for charity.”88 It was through sponsoring the refugees and hearing 
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their stories that many Americans grasped the effect of their government 
on Chile and its people.89  
The successful establishment of the 1975 parole program, 
however, was a qualified success in three ways. First, Kissinger continued 
to rationalize the program in terms that adhered to his own definition of 
the United States’ best interest. He described the program to admit 
Chilean refugees as a “cosmetic operation” that was necessary because at 
the same time, the United States was asking the rest of the world to 
accept Vietnamese refugees.90 After the program was established, Senator 
Kennedy expressed frustration with Kissinger’s perspective, emphasizing 
disappointment in his discovery that “the red tape barriers suddenly were 
broken” once the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees was brought into 
the equation.91   
Secondly, even after the passage of the 1975 Special Parole 
Program for Chilean Refugees, a reluctance to refer to the victims of 
Pinochet’s dictatorship as ‘refugees’ still existed in the US government. 
An October 1976 briefing for President Ford on a meeting between 
Secretaries Simon and Kissinger and several Chilean officials, written 
over a year after the enactment of the parole program, reported that 
“[t]he Chilean Government has released several hundred prisoners into 
exile in recent months.”92 This fact was portrayed as an accomplishment 
of the military government, an achievement in itself. While certainly a 
necessary step towards the resettlement of those several hundred 
prisoners, the briefing did not include that these exiled individuals would 
then be considered ‘refugees.’ 
The briefing proceeds to claim that the Chilean government had 
“committed itself to continue the US parole program and other similar 
programs,” transitioning between the creation and the resettlement of a 
refugee population still without once using the appropriate term to 
describe them.93 Routine references to Chilean ‘refugees’ would have 
been damaging to the Executive, as each use of the word would insult the 
anticommunist regime, as well as highlight the US government’s historic 
support of a dictatorship that had committed such abuses of human 
rights. Though the parole program was explicitly for Chilean refugees, 
this briefing’s avoidance of the word demonstrated a limit of the olidarity 
movement’s ability to influence the highest levels of the government.  
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Lastly, the parole program did relatively little to resettle the 
Chilean refugee population in the United States. By the time the US even 
agreed to welcome four hundred families through the 1975 legislation, 
Canada had already settled two thousand.94 The program was not open to 
Chileans who feared future persecution from the military dictatorship; 
only Chileans currently in prisons were eligible. Those who were 
members of the Communist party, had participated in leftist 
revolutionary movements, belonged to “other terrorist groups,” or had a 
criminal record were also barred.95 This final requirement was a real 
obstacle to most of the Chilean refugees, who fled their country precisely 
because they had supported its Marxist government. Further, Pinochet 
had criminalized support of Allende, a move that left many with a 
criminal record.96  
The 1975 parole program was one of several important successes 
of the solidarity movement. The allegation of US involvement in the 
Pinochet coup pushed Senator Frank Church to organize the Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities. The Church Committee, as it would be known, 
conducted hearings on US covert action and intelligence abuses during 
the 1970s.97 Like the Chilean solidarity movement’s activists, Church was 
concerned with the state of US democracy. On NBC’s Meet the Press in 
August 1975, in fact, Church came one step short of classifying American 
democracy as a failure by explaining that he knew “the capacity that is 
there to make tyranny total in America.” The potential for a dictator to 
take charge in the country existed, he explained, because of the “capacity 
that the intelligence community has given the government.”98 Church, 
whose committee also exposed the CIA and FBI for opening citizens’ 
mail, had already found the government to have abused that capacity.  
The Church Committee confirmed in the very first sentence of 
its 1976 report that “[c]overt United States involvement in Chile in the 
decade between 1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous.”99 This 
report, among other studies on government abuses of intelligence by the 
Church Committee, would cause President Ford to ban future US 
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support of assassinations of foreign leaders through a 1976 executive 
order, as well as to legally restrict the ability of the CIA to gather 
intelligence in the future.100 
Finally, President Jimmy Carter shared the solidarity movement’s 
view that US foreign policy must be consistent with the country’s 
democratic principles. In reaction to the human rights violations ignored 
by the Nixon and Ford administrations, Carter ran on a campaign that 
championed consideration of human rights as a necessary component of 
US foreign policy, demonstrating a redefinition of the United States’ 
priorities abroad. In a debate with Ford before the election, Carter 
accused Ford’s administration of having “overthrown an elected 
government and helped to establish a dictatorship in Chile.”101 Carter 
trusted that highlighting the Republican’s involvement in the destruction 
of a democracy would be a familiar point to a public sensitive to the 
topic.  
Once in office, Carter’s stance with Pinochet was firmer than 
that of his predecessors. Indicative of human rights’ new role in US 
policy, a declassified National Intelligence daily cable from July 1977 
stated that Chile was still “a long way off” from reestablishing the 
democracy it once had. The document also suggested, however, that “if 
the [Chilean] government follow[ed] through on its recent proposed 
actions [to relax the government’s emergency powers], the most blatant 
aspects of repression would be eased.” Pinochet, the document 
continued, “expect[ed] the US to react positively to these gestures.”102 By 
1977, Pinochet recognized that the United States was no longer prepared 
to tolerate his treatment of internal dissenters to his dictatorship. 
Pinochet’s recognition of the need to moderate his repressive regime 
suggested that in this regard, Carter upheld his welcomed promise to 
restore “the moral stature” the United States once exemplified in the 
world.103 
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Conclusions 
 
In order to protect the predominance of US political and 
economic interests abroad, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advocated 
a realpolitik pragmatism that in practice required supporting military 
dictators guilty of gross human rights violations. On the heels of both the 
Vietnam War and Watergate, however, the American public was 
disillusioned with a US government that demonstrated such imperialism 
and dishonesty, and feared that the nation’s leadership had lost sight of 
its commitment to democracy. Those who rallied in support of the 
Chilean refugees saw the restoration of democratic government in the 
United States as the country’s foremost national interest, as opposed to 
the dominance of its economy abroad or the restriction of communism 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
A movement primarily concerned with the health of American 
democracy was not composed of leftist activists seeking the re-
establishment of Allende’s Marxism in Chile. Instead, the efforts of 
scholars on university campuses, committed lobbyists and fact-finders in 
religious groups and NGOs, and Representative Drinan and Senator 
Kennedy in Congress complemented each other and formed a single 
front that ultimately achieved the establishment of the 1975 Special 
Parole Program for Chilean Refugees, among other gains.   
By 1980, CUSLAR was using its “fires of awareness and action” 
and financial resources to support Upstate New York chapters of the 
Network in Solidarity with Guatemala, the Committee in Solidarity with 
the People of El Salvador, and the Nicaragua Network.104 In the mid-
1980s, WOLA published the first major report documenting the 
Nicaraguan Contras’ human rights abuses, while the office’s founder, 
Joseph Eldridge, promoted human rights and development in 
Honduras.105 Many other organizations and individuals who identified 
and acted upon a concern for Chile during the 1970s were similarly 
propelled by the solidarity movement, and committed to continued 
advocacy for Latin America after having been part of the powerful 
coalition for Chile. Perhaps the most enduring legacy of the Chilean 
solidarity movement is that in placing Latin America, human rights, and 
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US imperialism within the United States’ popular political conscience, the 
movement laid the groundwork for solidarity movements that in 1973 
were unforeseen.  
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